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This paper argues that the formulation of policy, at whatever level, to whatever scale 
or scope, is any different to the myriad of processes involved in strategic planning 
within and between organisations, and the attendant decision making processes that 
abound in such an environment (Hage, 1980; Hickson, 1987; Thompson, 1967; 
Weick, 1976). Those forces that impact upon organisations are precisely the same 
forces that impact upon policy making groups who are themselves ‘organisations’ (or 
institutions), whether actual or representative. This provides a startign point for 
considering a synthesis between various models or paradigms. The argument 
continues, that program theory and the program logic model can incorporate and 
synthesise theories from elsewhere that, in turn, usefully inform and develop 
programme theory and program logic. A ‘hierarchical’ model is presented to explore 
the linkages between the components and ‘simple’ processes of theory, programme 
theory, logic modelling, organisational functioning, policy, and the consequent 
impact.  It is hoped that this model can be used as a framework to: (a) determine 
which components are essential to give the policy external validity, credibility, 
implementability, and so on; and (b) provide a common point of reference for policy 
makers, stakeholders, and evaluators. 
 
 
t is important, in terms of summative 
evaluation, to inform policy makers whether 
or not their policy has achieved what it intended 
to achieve and, mutatis mutandi, whether or not 
the intended results were achieved despite the 
policy and not because of it. For the evaluator, 
and policy makers and other stakeholders, 
articulated program theory provides a frame 
within which the findings of evaluation can be 
presented while simultaneously allowing those 
findings to challenge shortcomings in the policy. 
There seems to be no reason to assume that 
the formulation of policy, at whatever level, to 
whatever scale or scope, is any different to the 
myriad of processes involved in strategic 
planning within and between organisations, and 
the attendant decision making processes that 
abound in such an environment (Hage, 1980; 
Hickson, 1987; Thompson, 1967; Weick, 1976). 
Those forces that impact upon organisations are 
precisely the same forces that impact upon 
policy making groups who are themselves 
I 
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‘organisations’ (or institutions), whether actual 
or representative. 
The above considerations were the starting 
point for considering a synthesis between 
various models or paradigms with the logic 
model as the pivot for these sometimes 
competeing and apparrently disparate models. I 
argue here that program theory and the program 
logic model can incorporate and synthesise 
theories from elsewhere that usefully inform 
and develop programme theory and program 
logic.  
With regard to policy, programme theory 
was, and still is, one of the corner stones of 
evaluation theory. One of the problems of 
program theory is that it is rarely articulated 
(Bickman, 2000; Chen, 1990; Leeuw, 1991, 
2002; Rogers, Petrosino, Huebner & Hacsi, 
2000). Once program theory is articulated the 
results of the related policy can be framed 
within this theory. Of course, policy can also be 
considered a model or a paradigm. The point is 
that all policy must have a program theory to 
underpin it, even if this theory remains tacit and 
is not articulated. Therefore, the level of shared 
conceptual underpinning of a policy will, or 
should, correlate with the level of coherence of 
the policy (demonstrated by the evaluability of 
the policy) and similarly with the articulation of 
the program theory. This allows performance 
management to be further realised in relation to 
policy. Ironically, this approach potentially 
undermines itself as the contingent transparency 
exposes benevolent policy makers, including 
politicians, to hostile forces. This may, in turn 
be overcome by ensuring multiple 
accountability, for policy formulation as well as 
delivery, and presenting the theory in a form 
that is accessible to, and by, the public. 
‘Theory’ is, potentially, a rather grand term 
for program theory. Program theory comprises 
a set of assumptions, beliefs and (political) 
ideologies woven together to produce a 
formula, and a statement of intent, to solve a 
particular problem (Bickman, 1987; Chen, 1990; 
Davidson, 2000). This combination gives the 
policy a legitimised conceptual underpinning 
that the policy formulators can ‘buy into’ and 
‘sell.’ Put another way, policy formulators 
believe a policy will deliver the intended results 
because they assume, and believe, that the 
concepts and understandings they have bought 
together are valid and appropriate, and because 
they fit with the current ‘political’ (with a big or 
small 'P') ideology. As such program theory sits 
below the level of true theory, although true 
theory undoubtedly contributes to policy at 
times, and therefore by default to program 
theory. Program theory also allows the policy 
makers to learn and take ownership of the 
learning. It does this by providing a frame of 
reference for the policy makers to relate to and 
respond within. This frame of reference is, by 
default, owned and shared by the policy actors 
at all levels and provides a point of departure. 
What varies is the level and clarity of 
articulation and the level of understanding of 
where empiricism and theory stop and belief 
begins; all of which, I suggest here, can be 
clarified using program theory as a frame. 
Implicit within any programme theory is the 
program logic. Program logic is sub-theoretical 
and is the logical framework within which the 
policy, program or project is couched. It is the 
assumed cause-effect chain. One of the clearest 
articulations of program logic has been by 
United Way, (1996; Plantz, Greenway, & 
Hendricks, 1997). This model has a number of 
advantages over the more concise models; 
notably it includes actions and the breakdown 
of impact into proximal and distal outcomes, 
something that is in keeping with impact theory 
(Chen, 1990). Of course, like any log frame, the 
program logic model has significant weaknesses: 
it implies linear temporal continuity; it 
categorises into specific boxes without allowing 
for overlap; it does not assume outcomes until 
very late in the process; and so on. However, 
like any model it is a model, not a reality, and 
can be used intelligently to good effect. 
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The value of the program logic model is 
that it forces transparency in the chain of logical 
reasoning in relation to problem solving and can 
be used for problem identification. It allows for 
the intended structure of the policy to be clearly 
articulated and the components identified. It 
brings about a concrete realisation of the policy 
and can highlight flawed theory and reasoning 
very early on, as well as highlighting the 
allocation of resources and the effect of 
constraints. And, as with the program theory, it 
provides a powerful frame of reference both for 
the evaluation and for understanding the policy. 
For example, it can be developed retrospectively 
to understand a policy and this retrospective 
model compared to the initially proposed 
model. Of course, the development of program 
logic and, indeed, program theory, will constrain 
and restrict flexibility. It will also assuredly 
eliminate some aspects and forms of innovation 
(United Way, 1996; Plantz, Greenway, & 
Hendricks, 1997). That having been said, it will 
not necessarily inhibit innovative 
implementation of the policy. Nor will it, of 
necessity, inhibit the development of innovative 
policy. Important distinctions. 
A good program theory may identify a good 
policy. That is, one that has external validity and 
is practicable and viable, regardless of whether 
or not it is popular or whether or not anyone 
'believes' in the policy. If this program theory 
can be translated into program logic that has 
external validity then the policy may be further 
strengthened. Program theory and program 
logic can also be used to constrain the 
formulation of policy in the pluralistic 
environment. For example, when groups aim to 
influence policy their (re)presentation may be 
validated against the developing program 
theory, which may itself be tested, through a 
series of iterations, against actual theory. Once 
the components of theory, ideology, 
assumption, and belief are articulated and 
identified we should be able to measure the 
ratio of these. Ideally, the policy formulator 
should be aiming for the rapid development of 
a program theory that has external validity and 
that clearly relates to a program logic model that 
has a similar level of external validity (which is 
to say that the theory and logic are rational and 
are underpinned by data understood in the 
context of valid theory).  
 The argument thus far is that program 
theory and program logic provide a valid 
framework both for developing and evaluating 
policy. Van der Knaap (2003) has given this 
some consideration in relation to policy 
development and the evaluation of policy when 
he noted two dilemmas faced by policy makers: 
that policy theory is a simple representation of 
complex realities, and that dialogue with those 
involved in the policy improves policy but the 
resulting policy must in turn be legitamised in a 
‘democractic’ way. It is the complex realities 
that are the nub of concern. Precisely because 
these are the same concerns facing organisations 
and the decision-making processes within and 
between organisations. 
I developed the following model (see Figure 
1) to explore the linkages between the 
components and ‘simple’ processes of theory, 
programme theory, logic modelling, 
organisational functioning, policy, and the 
consequent impact. By using such a model we 
should be able to locate various components of 
policy in a particular cell. We should, using this 
model, and guided by available evidence, be able 
to determine which components are essential to 
give the policy external validity, credibility, 
implementability, and so on. This could occur 
ex-ante or ex-post. Once the components have 
been identified and located we should be able to 
trace the critical path of the policy (Poole, 
Davis, Reisman, & Nelson, 2001; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).
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1 World view/philosophy 
2 Empirical theory (social; economic; behavioural; psychological) 
  
3 Program Theory (assumption; belief; ideology) 
4 If…Then If…Then If…Then If…Then 
5 Theories of Change Theories of Change 
Theories of 
Change Theories of Change 
  
6 Input Action Output 
Impact = Outcomes (immediate (proximal); 
intermediate; long term (distal)) 
7 Means Working processes Results Problem solving impact 
8 
Resources AND 
Constraints  
9 Values  
10 Processes  
11 Organisation/s  
12 Structure/s  
13 Context Mechanism Outcome 
  
14 
Resources 
utilised within 
constraints 
leading to… 
actions resulting in utilisable 
outputs… 
outputs are utilised to solve problem/bring about 
change = outcome = impact 
Figure 1. Programme Theory Synthesis 
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I will briefly discuss each level of the model in 
turn (referenced as bold integers) and how they 
relate to each other. The filled grey cells 
between each referenced line indicate a 'break' 
between the family of lines. 
 
Explanation of the Model 
The first level (1) contains the ‘world views’ and 
philosophies that underpin disciplines and ways 
of thinking. They include the epistomological 
and ontological frameworks that policy makers 
and their advisors adhere to. They have had 
unprecedented influence across disciplines, and 
have both theoretical and practical implications. 
This level is important as it influences the way 
in which the other levels are interpreted and 
incoporated. We can see this level, in the 
language of the day, as the values of policy 
makers and their advisors. Level 2 contains the 
empirical theories that are more constrained and 
focussed on particular issues or problems. 
These must meet the same criteria of external 
validity, falsifiability and empirical testability and 
include the realms of the behavioural, social and 
economic. For example, any public policy that is 
charged with tackling the problem of 
unemployment should be based on sound 
behavioural, social and economic theory. 
Between these levels of theory and the next 
level (3), program theory, there is a break, as 
shown by the filled grey cells. This is to indicate 
that a meaningful relationship between 
empirical theory and program theory should not 
be taken for granted. The level of program 
theory is open to assumption, belief and 
ideological influence and has been discussed 
above. (This is not to say that empirical theory 
is not open to the same.) Program theory is 
strongly related to the sub-theoretical level of 
cause and effect that defines the log frame. This 
is characterised by a set of ‘if...then’ 
relationships between the components of the 
log frame (4). These sets of causal statements 
are ‘hypotheses’ underpinned by the program 
theory. These assumption of a causal chain may 
be based on as little evidence as a previous 
program 'working' or 'not working' according to 
some form of reporting, reviewing, or 
evaluation. That is, the causal chain is not 
necessarily related to empirical theory (the 
argument being that policy may be better off if 
it were more strongly related to empirical 
theory). Following the causal statements we 
have theories of change (5). A different theory 
of change may be applied to each sub-
theoretical causal hypothesis and these may, and 
will, vary within and between actors at all levels. 
This is to be expected and has been well 
rehearsed, well understood, and empirically 
validated as a psychological concept, in a 
number of arenas, including organisational 
learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Taylor & 
Crocker, 1981; Weick, 1979) 
From here we move onto the program logic 
model proper (6). The program logic model in 
its basic form breaks the program theory down 
into a set of components: Inputs; Actions; 
Outputs; Impact (Outcomes). These 
components are linked by the causal ‘if…then’ 
chain in level 4 and interpreted and understood, 
or framed, by the theories of change in level 5. 
Because different sets of actors have different 
theories of change their framing, and their 
concurrent interpretation and understanding, of 
level 4 and level 6 will vary. Put another way, 
the theories of change of different groups of 
actors will mediate between the program logic 
model proper and the assumed causal chain. 
The program logic model can be developed 
prior to the finalisation of policy and tested in a 
number of ways: against existing evidence (as 
pioneered by the GAO, 1990, with their 
Prospective Evaluation Synthesis); against 
empirical theory; in relation to the program 
theory; for logical consistency; and so on. It also 
provides a frame of reference for the program 
theory, itself another frame of reference. We see 
then that the program logic model relates to the 
rational-analytic framework (7) with the 
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components almost completely mapping 
together except that in the rational analytic 
framework we do not have the distinction 
between outputs and outcomes until we move 
to intermediate and long-term outcomes (distal 
outcomes). 
Continuing to track down the levels we then 
come to resources and constraints (8). Inputs 
comprise both resources and constraints. This 
challenges the flawed reasoning that the 
provision of resources will start the intended 
causal chain and that this will then follow 
through to impact. The provision of, or request 
for, a resource without due consideration of the 
constraints, environmental and otherwise, is all 
too common. The influence (for which you 
could read impact) of resources and constraints 
at the level of input are highlighted in 
organisational theory (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). 
And of course, something that is both a 
resource and a constraint are the values of the 
actors (9), which are in turn inherent in level 1. 
(Organisations and institutions are included as 
actors, whether they be commercial institutions, 
or organisations, producing goods/services for 
sale or institutions or organisations composed 
of the community and its traditions.) The values 
of the actors will impact upon the intended 
policy, from formulation through to evaluation, 
as will the values of the intended beneficiaries 
of the policy, at any and all levels. Similarly the 
values inherent in organisational culture impact 
on performance and delivery (Burt 1983; 
Dornbusch, 1995; Welch & Byrne, 2001). 
We can tie this in to processes (10), as 
follows. The life of the organisation (11) is 
dictated by production of predictable outputs 
with regularity and consistency (read reliability); 
outputs that have an external validity. For 
example, if you produce a low quality and 
unreliable product in a competitive market 
place, yet have high production costs and 
therefore have a high market purchase price, 
your business will likely fail.1 Even more so if 
there is no market (external validity) for your 
product (see Ball & Unwin, 1998, for an 
interesting twist on pseudo-markets in relation 
to policies of funding for nonprofits.) 
Organisations achieve regular, reliable and 
quality assured outputs by adhering to a set of 
processes underpinned by a set of values. Any 
new policy, or change to policy—equating to 
anything from a change in working practice to a 
complete change in culture—threatens this and 
challenges the production of the outputs, and 
the production of these outputs is the raison 
d'etre of the organisation/s. Established 
processes, supported by determined shared 
values, will therefore be resistant to change, as 
they should be. In principle, the organisation/s 
is not primarily concerned with outcomes. 
Given the importance now attributed to 
outcomes (often now couched as ‘impact’) in 
policy circles we will give this issue further 
consideration below where we discuss the 
relationship between the components of the 
model, particularly between outputs and 
outcomes. 
No organisation can operate or survive 
without structure/s to support it (12). Structures 
are provided by, and feed back into, the values 
and processes. They determine how the 
organisation operates both internally and in 
relation to its external environment. Similarly 
for the formulation of policy there must be 
structures that determine the interactions and 
relationships within and between policy makers 
and within and between policy makers and the 
external environment; the external environment 
having a momentous impact on the outcome of 
any policy, and indeed on the life of any 
organisation (e.g., in relation to structure see 
Blau, 1974; Ranson, Hinnings, & Greenwood, 
1980; Sewell, 1992). 
                                            
1 This premise can, of course, be challenged by examples 
of organisations that fail to deliver regular, consistent and 
valid outputs yet continue to survive.  
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The CMO model (13) proposed by Pawson 
and Tilley (1997) also fits within this 
framework. The importance of context as both 
a resource and constraint is highlighted time and 
again by organisational theory in relation to size, 
technology, internal culture, national culture and 
the wider environment. Pawson and Tilley 
perhaps underestimate the range of context, but 
overestimate its impact. Mechanisms are actions 
concerned with the production of a specific 
output (or set of outputs). The critique of the 
CMO model is that it ignores outputs. If the 
outputs are consistent, we have at least some 
degree of certainty that the program was 
implemented as intended, to the standard 
intended, and so on, and we have a point of 
departure for improving the programme as we 
can build our understanding in relation to the 
‘market place’ (that is, the environment and 
culture within which the outputs, or products, 
are being delivered; the size and capability of 
the delivering organisation; the technology 
available; and so on). 
The relationship between the components 
of the model are summarised in the final line 
(14), and it is here that we explore the 
relationship between outputs, outcomes and 
theory more fully. Resources are utilised within 
the constraints of the environment, the context, 
according to the values and processes as 
determined by the organisations (and influenced 
by institutions, which may be organisations 
themselves), to perform repeatable efficient and 
effective actions leading to reliable and 
replicable outputs. To facilitate this macro-
process structures are required, which 
themselves impose a further constraint that in 
the best-case scenario acts as a resource. This 
‘whole’ is the ‘box’ to ‘think outside of;’ the 
‘envelope’ to ‘push the edge of.’ With regard to 
the linear model, the ability of the organisation 
to control its own internal environment, and the 
extent to which it impacts on the external 
environment, is limited to the end stage of the 
production of outputs (beginning with the 
inputs; the resources and constraints). Past this 
point the range and variety of exogenous 
variables impacting upon the outcome are 
increasing, unpredictable and unknown, and the 
chance of causally affecting the outcome (and 
thus the impact) reduce exponentially the 
further one travels from the point of delivery of 
the output. How much the delivery of the 
output will effect a desired or intended 
outcome, and the extent to which it will impact 
upon the outcome, is the realm of theory and 
complex short-to-long-term prediction (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977; Bettman & Weitz, 1983, for 
false attribution of outcomes). 
Crucial to the realisation of outcomes then 
is the utilisability of the outputs, determined in 
part by their qualities of timeliness, integrity, 
reliability, and so on, as recognised by 
performance management (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977), and by demand in the market place. In 
addition: 
 outputs are measurable in terms of both 
quantity and quality; 
 focussing on delivering outputs allows 
organisations and other actors (including 
institutions and policy makers) to concern 
themselves with what they are actually able 
to do, and measure, not with what they are 
unlikely ever to be able to fully demonstrate 
as having achieved (that is, distal community 
outcomes and impact, though I accept and 
note that impact may be determined in 
some cases, particularly when the theory is 
sound); 
 focussing on outputs shortens the logic 
model and reduces infinite regress;2 
                                            
2 The author heard this concept introduced in a 
workshop presented by Michael Scriven at AEA 2002 
and his understanding is as follows: All actors assume 
that their assumptions are valid; the actors assume that 
the assumptions of others either match their own or are 
incorrect; the assumptions of the actors are based on the 
assumption that other long held assumptions are valid; 
and so on ad infinitum. As such we hit an infinite regress 
of assumptions. 
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 outputs provide a strong focus for policy 
makers and, in the pluralistic policy making 
environment, indicates the point at which 
the formulation must be made concrete; and 
 the policy maker takes conceptual, 
theoretical and actual responsibility for the 
outcomes, including identification of 
outcomes. For, if the outputs are delivered 
but the outcomes are not achieved then 
clearly it is the program theory that is at 
fault (see paragraph below). Given that 
there is, in our argument, an articulated 
program theory and logic model and, 
importantly, all actors who have contributed 
to the program theory are identified, due 
accountability can be determined as 
opposed to naming and blaming (and 
shaming) a ‘fall guy.’ 
To summarise and reiterate this point about 
outcomes, if outputs are not utilisable as 
intended, for whatever reason, then the link to 
the intended outcomes will break down. How 
far it breaks down will depend, in part, on how 
flawed the outputs are. Also, the assumption 
that utilisable-as-intended outputs will lead to 
intended outcomes does not necessarily hold. 
Much will depend on the environment into 
which the outputs are delivered and the shared 
values of the actors (for some practical 
examples see Campbell, 2002; Julian, 2001; 
Lake, Reis, & Spann, 2000). In relation to policy 
we can summarise this with the repetition of the 
two truisms: the intended outcome may not be 
achieved despite the policy being valid (when 
the utilisable outputs are delivered); the 
intended outcome may be achieved despite the 
policy and not because of it (the delivered 
outputs may not actually impact at all upon the 
outcome). 
                                                                                   
 
This relationship between outputs and 
outcomes, in relation to organisations and their 
operations, is best summarised in the words of 
Hall (2002): 
Organisations are not inert masses, even 
though they seem to be so at times. 
Even organisations that are seemingly 
inert have an impact by their very 
inertia, but that is not the point. The 
point is that organisations do things. 
They transform inputs into outputs. 
Those outputs have an impact on 
society. Individuals, groups and other 
organisations respond to organisational 
outputs. We are harmed and benefited 
by organisational outputs. In this sense 
we are the environment of 
organisations. Therefore, if we respond 
to organisations with support or 
opposition, and if we have power or can 
influence power holders, the 
environment responds to organisations 
(pg. 263). 
In sum, it is the outputs that make a 
difference as outcomes depend upon outputs. 
As such, the influences, processes, and actions 
that affect outputs and their delivery are crucial 
to policy, as are the intended outputs of the 
policy. 
The point is that through the use of 
appropriate modelling nested in theory the 
chain from inputs to outputs can be well 
defined, articulated and measured. The output is 
either present in the intended quantity at the 
intended quality, or it is not. Whether the 
outputs will be utilised, how they will be 
utilised, and if they will lead to the intended 
outcomes is the realm of theory, especially 
program theory as this includes the assumptions 
of the actors. That is, the causal link from 
outputs to outcomes, and indeed, the 
achievement of outcomes, when outcomes are 
equated with impact is, at very best, theoretical.3 
                                            
3 We are at pains to make the distinction here that we are 
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This theoretical link is important to 
measurement and evaluate as if the theory has 
external validity and is empirically sound the 
point at which we measure does not matter that 
much as the results are predicted by the theory, 
not by the measurement itself. In addition, we 
have a framework for interpreting what would 
otherwise simply be a set of measures with no 
real validity. Thus we highlight a constraint of 
the role of theory, and also the importance. 
Consider, also, that, exceptions 
notwithstanding, relatively few activities, 
policies, programs or projects last for long 
enough, or have enough resource made 
available, to determine the actual outcomes 
across contexts and over time (the impact). 
Using the model described above provides a 
frame of reference for the evaluation of policy. 
It should also provide anchors and pegs from 
which to hang the findings and 
recommendations of an evaluation. It provides 
a framework that is familiar to the policy maker, 
and that has had already had significant 
investment from policy maker/s. Couching the 
program theory in terms of the model allows us 
to latch onto the cognitive schemas of the 
policy maker/s and other actors and thus 
enables them to take immediate ownership of 
the evaluation findings (Geva-May & Pal, 1999). 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to argue for 
greater synthesis of theory, logic modelling and 
organisational theory in order to move towards 
a more focussed and stronger theory of 
evaluation per se. The paper has tended towards 
the realm of programme theory and policy 
                                                                                   
not advocating the abolition of outcomes. We are arguing 
that performance management based on outcomes is not 
as straightforward as it is sometimes made out to be 
(Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999, for a counter to this 
statement). Instead, we argue that the theoretical link 
between outputs and outcomes is the responsibility of the 
policy maker and should be at least part of, and included 
in, their strategic focus. 
evaluation as that is where the evaluation 
community tends to focus most of its efforts, 
and is the primary market for the evaluator as a 
professional practitioner. Nonetheless, the 
model, one hopes, should contain sufficient 
flexibility to be adapted for other fields of 
evaluation practice. 
The expanded model presented here 
contributes to the development of evaluation 
theory and the modelling of that theory as a 
complete package rather than as a series of 
disparate competing theories. It unites several 
common themes and ideas and explores the 
links across disciplinary boundaries rather than 
emphasising disciplinary boundaries. 
Furthermore, the model should provide some 
insight for both practitioners and policy makers, 
and help them to find a common language for 
the discipline of evaluation. 
Linking the program logic model back 
to levels of theory allows for evaluation findings 
to be framed by existing tested theories with 
reproducible results. Some policy areas have 
already taken these steps, noticeably areas such 
as health, health and safety, and economic 
policy. Evaluators of social policy can learn 
from these areas and can make use of this 
model as a framework for the application of 
theory to policy according to their own 
professional interests. 
 
Author notes 
1. Resources and constraints, values and 
processes, actions, and utilisability of 
outputs, apply to all actors including 
participants. 
2. Outcomes have levels as well: outcomes for 
individuals; communities; the implementers; 
the policy makers. 
3. It is false to consider outcomes ocurring in a 
nice, neat temporal manner along a causal 
chain as dictated by the policy maker, 
researcher, evaluator, or whomsoever 
decides. As soon as inputs are made 
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available, and before they even enter into 
the system, mulitple chains of (potential and 
actual) outcomes will be initiated by default. 
This relates back to Chaos Theory. For 
practical purposes, and in a pragmatic 
context, it is not always necessary to take 
account of this, however. What we should 
be continually aware of are negative or 
harmful consequences at any stage—
deleterious outcomes—and of not falsely 
assigning causes to outcomes. 
4. This really needs to be considered as a 
multi-dimensional, covariant (within and 
between cells and levels) iterative model. 
Clearly though, such models are difficult to 
represent other than as mathematical or 
statistical models. 
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